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planned spare parts levels.  This will be accomplished 
through the integration of factors impacting spare parts 
levels and Life Cycle Costs into a spreadsheet model that 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the 
relationship between predicted component reliability, 
planned spare parts levels, and Life Cycle Costs.   
1. The Problem 
In the past, Major Defense Acquisition Programs  
(MDAPs) have based their spare parts levels on sometimes 
poor estimations of reliability.  This, in turn, can cause 
a severe shortage of spare parts after the system has been 
fielded.  As this thesis will later relate, this inability 
to get the required spare parts when they are needed 
degrades a system’s overall Operational Availability (Ao) 
and lowers a combat units mission readiness and 
effectiveness. 
2. The Solution Proposed by This Thesis 
 When a Program is considering ways to determine spare 
parts levels, a variety of tools are used, but all of them 
must take into account an estimate of component 
reliability.  This thesis will highlight the importance of 
reliability information when setting spares levels and 
determining the overall Life Cycle Cost (LCC) of a Program.    
3. If the Problem Continues 
 Through the use of historical data, this thesis will 
attempt to show the difficulties that operating forces have 
endured in the past when actual reliability figures have 
been low compared to the estimated reliability of a system 
or system component.  In these instances, spare parts 
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shortages are prevalent, which in turn leads to decreased 
Ao and mission readiness, and increased cannibalization. 
B. DISCUSSION 
In the early 1970s, the United States Marine Corps 
began to purchase the UH-1N and the AH-1J aircraft to 
fulfill the ongoing mission requirements of a utility 
helicopter and an attack helicopter respectively.  In the 
mid 1970s, the Squadrons made up of each of these aircraft 
were consolidated to take advantage of the commonality 
possessed by the two airframes that included engines, rotor 
systems, drive trains, and more.  This provided a manpower 
saving to the Marine Corps through reduction of maintenance 
personnel.  During the 1980s the Marine Corps bought new 
variants of the AH-1, each of which subsequently had less 
and less commonality with the UH-1N.  In an effort to 
rediscover the savings found in commonality between the two 
airframes, the USMC has combined an upgrade for the AH-1W 
model and a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) for the 
UH-1N into a new program called the “H-1 Upgrade Program.”  
The product of this program will be two new airframes for 
the utility and the attack mission, but with at least 84% 
component commonality between them.   
Currently, the H-1 Upgrade Program is undergoing the 
Engineering Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase of the 
acquisition cycle.  During this period, key assumptions and 
measurements are being made to predict the potential 
reliability of key components and the overall system.  
These measurements will be used to determine levels of 
spares required during initial fielding.  This information 
is designed to give the Program Manager an understanding of 
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the O&S costs that will follow the airframes after 
fielding.  These O&S costs can be up to 60% of the Total 
Ownership Cost (TOC) of a system so it is imperative that 
an accurate estimation be made during the program’s EMD 
phase.  For the H-1 Upgrade program, the current O&S cost 
estimate is over 60% of the TOC or over $8 billion. It is 
at this time that the program office must “get it right” 
for the future of the program for both cost and readiness 
reasons. 
Past experience within the aviation community has 
highlighted instances where poor estimations of system 
reliability has saddled system operators (the warfighters) 
with unnecessary delays, poor availability, or dangerous 
situations due to spare parts shortages.  This has also 
lead to increased cannibalization and extended maintenance 
cycles.  Proper estimation of reliability is imperative for 
accurate spares planning, but this needs to be emphasized 
as early as possible in the acquisition process.  An 
attempt will be made, through this thesis, to highlight 
this situation to the Program Manager (PM) and others 
within the acquisition community responsible for spares 
determination.    
The O&S cost prediction tools that a PM has at his 
disposal are the figures generated for him by his budget 
office based on the measurements given to him by the 
engineers conducting the reliability tests of the 
components and the system.  If the PM wants to “what if…” a 
situation, he needs to wait while figures are regenerated 
through this process.  Presenting this thesis and the tools 
developed through it to the H-1 Upgrades PM, may provide 
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him with an additional tool for understanding the tradeoffs 
that sometimes must be made in an environment of 
uncertainty and fiscal constraints. Additionally, this 
thesis will attempt to show that the greatest return on 
investment for any program is the direct investment in 
system reliability to increase Ao and reduce O&S costs 
during the life cycle of the system. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
How are reliability estimations and planned spares 
levels related to Life Cycle Costs in a Major Program? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
• What methods are being used by the H-1 Upgrade 
Program to improve overall reliability and 
availability? 
• How are reliability and availability measured in 
general and by the H-1 Upgrade Program specifically? 
• What information about reliability and availability 
estimations will be of greatest use to the PM to 
help make more informed decisions about O&S cost 
allocations? 
• What is the impact on O&S costs, Ao, and spares 
levels if the flying hour rate is higher than 
planned, such as during surge or contingency 
operations? 
• After system fielding, how are spare parts levels 
adjusted as estimations of reliability are replaced 
by actual reliability figures? 
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D. SCOPE OF THIS THESIS 
The focus of this thesis is on constructing a 
spreadsheet model to estimate the Spares Levels and LCC of 
H-1 Upgrade Program critical components based on proper 
reliability estimations and subsequent spare parts 
planning.  This model will be used to analyze the impact of 
changing reliability figures on the O&S costs and Spares 
Levels of the program.  The historical precedence for 
changes in reliability figures will be made using examples 
from past Programs.   
The scope is limited to the reliability of critical 
components within the H-1 Upgrade Program.  The model will 
not attempt to take into consideration the Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) used by the Aviation 
Combat Element (ACE) within the Marine Air Ground Task 
Force (MAGTF) when employing the H-1 airframes. 
The model is also limited by the accuracy of the 
information that will be entered into the model.  Because 
the new H-1 airframes have not completed EMD or undergone 
fielding yet, much of the data is either projections or 
forecasts that may change as the program progresses.  These 
scope limitations should not detract from the general 
findings and conclusions of the thesis research. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in the research of this thesis 
will include, but not be limited to: 
• Conduct a comprehensive literature search of books, 
magazine articles, CD-ROM systems, and Internet-
based materials. 
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• Conduct a comprehensive review of Government reports 
concerning issues with reliability, availability, 
spare parts planning, and critical elements of the 
H-1 Upgrade Program which may effect O&S costs and 
reliability. 
• Conduct visits, telephone interviews, and email 
interviews with H-1 Upgrade program members and 
others to gather current and relevant data necessary 
for the realistic modeling of component and system 
reliability. 
• Build a model using Microsoft Excel® software that 
incorporates as many factors as possible affecting 
LCC, spares levels, and protection levels for 
components of the H-1 Upgrade Program. 
• Run multiple simulations with the model, varying 
reliability and other factors within realistic 
ranges. 
• Analyze and interpret the results of the simulations 
and draw conclusions. 
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
1. Chapter I, Introduction   
Identifies the purpose of the thesis as well as the 
primary and secondary research questions. 
2. Chapter II, Background   
Provides a basic understanding of the elements 
included  in   the   H-1   Upgrade  Program  estimation  of  
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reliability and planned spare parts levels.  This chapter 
also contains a brief description of the H-1 Upgrade 
Program. 
3. Chapter III, H-1 Upgrade Program Model and Data 
Presents the methodology and logic behind the 
reliability, availability, and O&S cost spreadsheet model. 
4. Chapter IV, Results and Analysis 
Provides a discussion of the running of the simulation 
and analyzes the results to determine impacts on spares 
levels and O&S costs. 
5. Chapter V, Conclusions and Recommendations 
Summarizes the findings of the research, attempts to 






























II. BACKGROUND  
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a basic 
understanding of the elements included in the H-1 Upgrade 
Program estimation of reliability and planned spare parts 
levels.  This chapter also contains a brief description of 
the H-1 Upgrade Program. 
B. H-1 UPGRADE PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 
The H-1 Upgrade Program was chosen for this research 
for a variety of reasons.  There are many current MDAPs 
that are wrestling with setting spare parts levels for the 
operations and support of their systems.  The H-1 Upgrade 
Program, presently moving from Developmental Testing (DT) 
to Operational Testing (OT), is on the verge of setting 
spare parts levels for at least the next five years based 
on estimated and observed reliability of the test articles 
and through correlations with similar airframes. 
Additionally, the H-1 Upgrade Program, with a current 
estimated Total Ownership Cost (TOC) of over $14 billion, 
is attempting to capitalize on the use of identical 
components between two separate airframes to reduce overall 
spare parts quantities and manpower requirements.  This use 
of identical components between two platforms has caused a 
greater emphasis on getting the right parts in the right 
quantities to the right places at the right time.  Once 
these spare parts are funded and in place, they will 
require the full logistical support of the H-1 Upgrade 
Program Team and the Naval Inventory Control system. 
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Also, a Marine Corps system provides a more compact 
view of the overall logistics support system of the 
Department of the Navy (DoN) and the Department of Defense 
(DoD) since there are fewer aircraft and fewer bases than 
in other branches of the Armed Forces. 
Bell Helicopter-Textron, the company selected to 
develop the H-1 Upgrade for the USMC, states the reasons 
for the decision to merge the two airframes in the 
following public statement: 
   The Marine Corps has begun the H-1 Upgrade 
Program to meet expanding mission requirements 
between now and the initiation of the Joint 
Replacement Aircraft program in the year 2020.  
The AH-1Z will replace the AH-1W and the UH-1Y 
will replace the UH-1N as remanufactured 
airframes to take advantage of the latest 
technologies, with improvements in crew and 
passenger survivability, payload, power 
availability, endurance, range, speed, 
maneuverability, and supportability. 
Both new airframes will share the same four-
bladed, all-composite, hingeless, bearingless 
rotor system and drive train.  Additionally, they 
will share the same engines, transmissions, 
hydraulics, electrical systems and tailbooms.  
Therefore, both helicopters will share three out 
of five repairable items.  The savings in 
maintenance staffing and training, ground 
handling and support equipment, and spare parts 
inventories are enormous, estimated to be at 
least $3.9 billion over the life of the program. 
This recapitalization program will result in 280 
essentially new aircraft.  The USMC will receive 
“zero-time” airframes, not just rebuilt, but 
remanufactured, with the latest in helicopter 
technology.  In contrast, the only competing  
 
program [AH-64 Apache and UH-60 Blackhawk 
variants] would result in 1970’s vintage-
technology aircraft, at a much higher price. 
One portion of the above statement that this thesis 
would try to clarify is how sensitive this estimated $3.9 
billion savings are to the accuracy of the reliability 
estimations that Bell Helicopter and others have and will 
place upon the systems and components used to manufacture 
and support these new airframes.   
C. THE DEFERRED MODERNIZATION CYCLE 
Unfortunately, many of the decisions made in any MDAP 
are based on fiscal constraints rather than solely on the 
needs of the system operators and maintainers. 
The recent trend of deferring modernization during the 
budgeting process is disturbing to anyone who realizes that 
with the decreased procurement of new systems, the aging 
systems being maintained by our fleet operators require 
greater and greater spending on O&S costs.  This has been 
referred to as the “Aging Weapon Systems/Deferred 
Modernization Death Spiral” as illustrated in Figure 1.    
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Figure 1.   Deferred Modernization Cycle 
[From Ref 3] 
D. OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT COST BACKGROUND 
How is the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) of a MDAP system 
calculated?  The life cycle of a weapon system begins with 
the determination of a mission or capability requirement, 
continues through the engineering and manufacturing 
development (EMD), production and deployment, and 
operations and support (O&S) phases to the eventual 
disposal or demilitarization of the system by the 
government.  For purposes of cost estimating, life cycle 
costs typically are divided into four components: research 
and development, investment, operating and support, and 
disposal.  Figure 2 illustrates the program life cycle and 
shows how its various phases relate to the phases of a 
system’s life cycle cost.  The pattern of spending shown in 
Figure 2 is typical, but may not be followed by every 
program.   
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Figure 2.   Life Cycle Cost Illustration       
[From Ref 2] 
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E. OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT COST ESTIMATES 
Operations and Support costs include all costs of 
operating, maintaining, and supporting a fielded system.  
Current estimated total O&S costs for the H-1 Upgrades 
program is over $8 billion.  O&S costs encompass costs for 
personnel, consumable and repairable materials, and repairs 
at all levels of maintenance (Operational, Intermediate, 
and Depot), facilities, and sustaining investment.  O&S 
Costs are incurred in preparation for and after a system’s 
fielding and continue through the end of the system’s 
useful life.[From Ref 2]   
The cost of operating and maintaining a system over 
it’s useful life is driven primarily by policy, system 
design, operating rate or tempo (optempo), and reliability 
and maintainability decisions, which typically are made 
prior to entering production.  O&S cost information is used 
for a variety of purposes in the acquisition process, 
including to: 
• Support the current design-to cost (DTC) program 
• Support management reviews 
• Discriminate between competing systems 
• Support budget estimates 
While development and production estimates play a 
major role in decisions on the Future Years Defense Program 
(FYDP) and the President’s Budget, O&S costs have an 
important, if less visible, role.  This is because the 
support segments of the budget are organized by functional 
area rather than by the weapon system.[From Ref 2]    
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The nature of cost estimates and cost comparisons 
depends on the acquisition program phase and the specific 
issues involved.  At “Milestone A”, very little may be 
known about the design of a proposed system, but rough 
estimates of O&S costs are expected.  In preparation for 
“Milestone B”, O&S cost estimates and cost comparisons 
ought to show increased accuracy, consistent with more 
fully developed configurations and support concepts.  As a 
program approaches Milestone B, the subsystem cost drivers 
most likely to influence O&S costs should be identified.  
Although the specific determinants of cost may vary by 
system, they can generally be grouped into three 
categories: 
• Physical characteristics- weight, volume, density, 
etc. 
• Policy parameters- optempo, maintenance concept, 
crew ratio, etc. 
• Performance characteristics- power, speed, range, 
reliability, etc. 
Alternative approaches, design trade-offs, and the 
sensitivity of O&S costs to change in these cost drivers 
should be carefully evaluated in the cost and operational 
effectiveness analysis. 
The O&S cost estimates prepared for “Milestone C” 
should be based on the current design characteristics of 
the weapon system, the deployment schedule, and the 
operations and maintenance concept.  Critical subsystems 
and any DTC goals established for them must be validated.  
Operating experience obtained during system test and 
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evaluation (T&E) should be used to verify progress in 
meeting logistics goals or to identify problem areas.[From 
Ref 2]  
F. OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT COST ELEMENT STRUCTURE 
As previously discussed, support segments of the 
budget are organized by functional area rather than by the 
weapon system.  These cost elements are listed individually 
for purposes of program support, but are interdependent.  A 
new program, or a program attempting to leverage previous 
program elements, such as the H-1 Upgrade program, will 
attempt to base much of their O&S cost estimation on 
historical data collected from similar Programs. 
The O&S cost element structure for an aircraft system 
is broken down into the following numbered elements and 
sub-elements: 
• 1.0 Mission Personnel 
o 1.1 Operations 
o 1.2 Maintenance 
 Organizational Maintenance 
 Intermediate Maintenance not covered 
elsewhere 
 Ordnance Maintenance 
 Other Maintenance Personnel 
o 1.3 Other Mission Personnel 
 Unit Staff 
 Security 
 Other Support 
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• 2.0 Unit Level Consumption 
o 2.1 Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL)/Energy 
Consumption 
o 2.2 Consumable Material/Repair Parts 
 Maintenance Material 
 Operational Material 
 Mission Support Supplies 
o 2.3 Depot-Level Repairables 
 Depot Level Repairable (DLR) spares used 
to replace initial stocks 
o 2.4 Training Munitions/Expendable Stores 
o 2.5 Other 
 Purchased Services 
 Transportation 
 Temporary Additional Duty (TAD)/Temporary 
Duty (TDY) Payments 
• 3.0 Intermediate Maintenance (External to Unit) 
o 3.1 Maintenance 
o 3.2 Consumable Material/Repair Parts 
o 3.3 Other 
• 4.0 Depot Maintenance 
o 4.1 Overhaul/Rework 
o 4.2 Other 
• 5.0 Contractor Support 
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o 5.1 Interim Contractor Support 
o 5.2 Contractor Logistics Support 
o 5.3 Other 
• 6.0 Sustaining Support 
o 6.1 Support Equipment Replacement 
o 6.2 Modification Kit Procurement/Installation 
o 6.3 Other Recurring Investment 
o 6.4 Sustaining Engineering Support 
o 6.5 Software Maintenance Support 
o 6.6 Simulator Operations 
o 6.7 Other 
• 7.0 Indirect Support 
o 7.1 Personnel Support 
 Specialty Training 
 Permanent Change of Station Costs 
 Medical Support 
o 7.2 Installation Support 
 Base Operating Support 
 Real Property Maintenance [From Ref 2] 
Within this thesis, we will address the O&S cost 
elements associated with consumable material and repair 
parts.  These elements, as you can see from the listing 
above, are just one of many cost drivers that must be taken 
into consideration by a program when structuring for a 
successful life cycle.  This may be the reason that 
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estimates for reliability are not as thoroughly 
scrutinized, and sometimes overlooked, leading to potential 
problems in maintaining system operational availability 
levels. 
G. LIFE CYCLE COST 
As defined by Blanchard (1998), Life Cycle Cost 
involves all costs associated with the system life cycle, 
to include: 
• Research and Development (R&D) cost- the cost of 
feasibility studies; system analyses; detail design 
and development, fabrication, assembly, and test of 
engineering models; initial system test and 
evaluation; and associated documentation. 
• Production and Construction cost- the cost of 
fabrication, assembly, and test of operational 
systems (production models); operation and 
maintenance of the production capability; and 
associated initial logistic support requirements 
(e.g. test and support equipment development, 
spares/repair parts provisioning, technical data 
development, training, entry of items into 
inventory, facility construction, etc.). 
• Operation and Maintenance (O&M) costs- the cost of 
sustaining operation, personnel and maintenance 
support, spare/repair parts and related inventories, 
test and support equipment maintenance, 
transportation and handling, facilities, 
modifications and technical data changes, and so on. 
• System retirement and phase-out cost- the cost of 
phasing the system out of the inventory due to 
obsolescence or wear-out, and subsequent equipment 
item recycling and reclamation as appropriate.    
H. RELIABILITY 
“Reliability isn’t everything, it’s the ONLY thing!” 
[From Ref 4]  This powerful statement has attempted to 
focus the attention of Program personnel whose job it is to 
make sure the systems we field are reliable for our 
operating forces.  In focusing on reliability as it relates 
to the setting of spare parts levels, we must first come to 
understand just what is meant by reliability.   
1. Reliability Expressed Mathematically 
Since reliability will be the focus of this thesis as 
we explore historical trends in spare parts procurement, 
let us first define reliability in mathematical terms so we 
have a common frame of reference: 
( ) K tR t e λ−=  
R= reliability of the component or system 
t= the time period of interest 
e= the natural logarithm base (2.7182) 
K= the number of components or systems used (sometimes 
expressed with the variable “n”) 




With the formula above we also take into consideration 
the four components of reliability: probability, 
satisfactory performance, time, and specified operating 
conditions. 
2. Factors Relating to Reliability 
Three types of availability related to reliability are 
Inherent Availability (Ai), Achieved Availability (Aa), and 
Operational Availability (Ao).  These are important as a 
measure of how often a component or system is ready to be 
used by the operator under different operating conditions.  
The most important factor for our research will be 
operational availability.   
Operational Availability (Ao) is not currently a Key 
Performance Parameter (KPP) on many Programs, but may need 
to become a primary metric to measure how the fielded 
system is performing for the system operator. 
Why is Ao such an important concept?  Ao is defined as 
the probability that a system, when used under specified 
operating conditions in an actual operational environment 
will operate satisfactorily when required. 
Mathematically, this is stated: 
MTBMAo
MTBM MDT
= +  
where Mean Time Between Maintenance (MTBM) is the 
reciprocal of the frequency of maintenance that includes 
both scheduled maintenance and unscheduled maintenance.  
Mean Maintenance “Down Time” (MDT) is the mean of all the 
recorded maintenance time that the system was unavailable 
for use due to either scheduled or unscheduled maintenance. 
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It is important to note that this expression takes 
into consideration ACTUAL operational conditions and ALL 
maintenance actions involved with the system or component.         
I. DETERMINING SPARE PARTS LEVELS 
Currently, the H-1 Upgrade Program is following the 
Marine Aviation Logistics Plan (MALP) to support the 
development and fielding of the system.  The program has 
taken historical data from similar platforms and combined 
them to input data into the Aviation Retail Requirements 
Oriented to Weapons Replaceable Assembly (WRA) or “ARROW” 
model (a “Readiness Based Sparing Model” using operational 
availability as its key parameter) for determination of 
spares levels during the programs Interim Support Period 
(ISP).[From Ref 7]  The ISP for the H-1 Upgrade Program is 
scheduled to last until the Material Support date of 
approximately 2010.  This determination function is 
outsourced by the Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) in 
Philadelphia to a private contractor who runs the ARROW 
model as often as necessary to meet reporting requirements. 
Currently, the contractor does not have enough solid 
data from the Developmental Test (DT) or Operational Test 
(OT) aircraft to make accurate inputs into the model.  It 
is precisely at this moment in the system life that the 
program office needs to emphasize accurate reliability 
estimates and understand the delicate balance needed to 
ensure adequate spares for the warfighters and adequate 
funding prioritization by the PM. 
When designing a system, it is important to consider 
life cycle cost through concept, development, production, 
and field support.  When selecting a part, one must 
  22
consider the non-recurring design cost, the recurring 
material cost, and the production and support costs.  Each 
of these costs must be balanced against the others to 
identify the optimal part for the application.  Whatever 
device is selected must satisfy the design-to-cost model 
for the system. 
The following information explains the basic methods 
for determining spares levels. 
1. Supply Support Factors 
A significant portion of O&S costs go to purchase the 
spare parts that a system will need during the course of 
its time in the field with the operators and through its 
various levels of maintenance. 
Blanchard (1998) states “supply support includes spare 
parts and the associated inventories necessary for the 
accomplishment of unscheduled and scheduled maintenance 
actions.” [From Ref 1] 
At each maintenance level, Operational (O-Level), 
Intermediate (I-Level), and Depot (D-Level), one must 
determine the type and the quantity of the spare parts to 
be purchased and stocked.  Also, it is necessary to know 
how various items should be ordered and the number of items 
that should be procured in a given purchasing transaction. 
Spare parts requirements are initially based on the 
system maintenance concept and are subsequently defined and 
justified through the Program’s Supportability Analysis 
(SA).  Essentially, spares quantities are a function of the 
demand rates and include consideration of: 
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• Spares and repair parts covering actual item 
replacements occurring as a result of corrective and 
preventative maintenance actions.  Spares are major 
replacement items that are repairable, whereas 
repair parts are nonrepairable smaller components. 
• An additional stock level of spares to compensate 
for repairable items in the process of undergoing 
maintenance.  If there is a backup (lengthy queue) 
of items in the I-Level maintenance shop or at the 
D-Level awaiting repairs, these items obviously will 
not be available as recycled spares for subsequent 
maintenance actions; thus, the inventory is further 
depleted (beyond expectation), or a stock-out 
condition results.  In addressing this problem, it 
becomes readily apparent that the test equipment 
capability, personnel, and facilities directly 
impact the maintenance turnaround times and the 
quantity of additional spare items needed. 
• An additional stock level of spares and repair parts 
to compensate for the procurement lead times 
required for item acquisition.  For instance, 
prediction data may indicate that ten maintenance 
actions requiring the replacement of a certain item 
will occur within a six-month period and it takes 
nine months to acquire replacements from the 
supplier.  One might ask: what additional repair 
parts will be necessary to cover the operational 
needs and yet compensate for the long suppliers lead 
time?  The added quantities will, of course, vary 
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depending on whether the item is designated as 
repairable or will be discarded at failure. 
• An additional stock level of spares to compensate 
for the condemnation or scrapage of repairable 
items.  Repairable items returned to the 
intermediate maintenance shop or depot are sometimes 
condemned (i.e., not repaired) because, through 
inspection, it is decided that the item was not 
economically feasible to repair.  Condemnation will 
vary depending on the equipment utilization, 
handling, environment, and organizational 
capability.  An increase in the condemnation rate 
will generally result in an increase in the spare 
parts requirements.       
In reviewing these considerations, of particular 
significance is the determination of spares requirements as 
a result of item replacements in the performance of 
corrective maintenance.  Major factors involved in this 
process are: 
• The reliability of the system to be spared 
• The quantity of items used 
• The required probability that a spare will be 
available when needed (i.e., the protection level) 




2. Probability of Success with Spares Availability 
Considerations 
Blanchard (1998) uses the following example:  Assume 
that a single component with a reliability of 0.8 (for time 
t) is used in a unique system application and that one 
backup spare component is purchased [From Ref 1].  Using 
the following equation to determine the probability of the 
system’s success having a spare available in time t (given 
that failures occur randomly and are exponentially 
distributed): 
  
( )t tP e t eλ λλ− −= + 
With a component reliability of 0.8, the value of λt is 
0.223.  Substituting this value into the equation gives a 
probability of success of: 
  0.223 0.223(0.223)P e e− −= +
or 
P= 0.8 + (0.223)(0.8) = 0.9784 
Assuming next that the component is supported by two 
backup spares (where all three components are 
interchangeable), the probability of success during time t 
is determined by the equation: 








− −= + +   
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Or through simplification 
2( )1
2!
t tP e tλ λλ− ⎡ ⎤= + +⎢⎣ ⎥⎦   
 
With a component reliability of 0.8 and a value of λt 





⎡ ⎤= + +⎢⎣ ⎥⎦  = 0.9983  
Thus, adding another spare component results in one 
additional term in the Poisson expression (the Poisson and 
exponential distributions are essentially equivalent in 
this case.  For the exponential, the random variable is the 
time to failure, whereas it is the number of failures per a 
given time period for the Poisson.  The exponential 
variable is continuous and the Poisson variable is 
discrete).  The additional spare provides an extra 2% 
reliabilty. 
3. Spare Parts Quantity Determination 
Blanchard (1998) helps us understand spare parts 
quantity determination through the following explanation: 
Spare parts quantity determination is a function of the 
probability of having a spare part when it is needed, the 
reliability of the system or component, and the quantity of 
the components used in the system.   
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In determining spare parts quantities, we must 
consider the protection level or safety factor desired.  
This is the probability of having a spare part available 
when required.  The higher the protection level, the 
  27
greater the quantity of spares required to avoid a stock-
out situation.  This results in a higher cost for item 
procurement and inventory maintenance.  A higher protection 
level, or safety factor, is a hedge against the risk of 
stock-out, which could affect mission readiness or 
accomplishment. 
When determining spare parts quantities, we must also 
consider system operational requirements (e.g., system 
effectiveness, availability) and establish the appropriate 
level at each location where corrective maintenance is 
accomplished.  Different levels of corrective maintenance 
may be appropriate for different items.  For instance, 
spares required to support prime equipment components which 
are critical to the success of a mission may be based on 
one factor; high-value or high-cost items may be handled 
differently than low-cost items; and so on.  In any event, 
an optimum balance between stock level and cost is 
required. [From Ref 1] 
4. Sensitivity to Reliability Changes 
The issue of differences between estimated reliability 
and actual reliability has been a subject of debate for 
many years and is what prompted this thesis research.  In 
the past, some contractors or program offices may have 
overestimated reliability due to the saving in support 
costs that could be calculated based on these higher rates, 
or an unexpected, significant decrease in MTBF is 
encountered due to unforeseen circumstances.   
Within NAVAIR, a good example of the latter would be 
the difficulties encountered with the F/A-18 Trailing Edge 
Flap (TEF) hydraulic actuator.  Reliability estimations for 
  28
the TEF hydraulic actuator were based on historical data 
from similar applications, but the system interface of the 
F/A-18 TEF was different than other aircraft.  The TEF on 
the F/A-18 did not program to one position and act as a 
stationary flap as it did on other aircraft; the F/A-18 TEF 
was in constant motion as a control surface.  This put 
greater demands on the TEF hydraulic actuator and caused a 
much higher than expected failure rate. 
In establishing initial support for the TEF hydraulic 
actuator, an estimate of reliability of 4000 hours MTBF (or 
λ= .00025) was used by the supplier and subsequently by the 
F/A-18 Program office.  After a period of operational 
service, the MTBF figure of merit was actually shown to be 
900 hours (or λ= .0011).  This prompted spare parts 
shortages and subsequent cannibalizations by O-Level 
maintainers to try and meet their desired operational 
availability for mission accomplishment.  [From Ref 4]        
The following highlights from an Air Force Materiel 
Command (AFMC) memorandum [Ref 5] showcases some of the 
problems identified with reliability figure uncertainty and 
sensitivity: 
Lessons Learned 
The sensitivity of Air Force operational goals 
(mission capability, utilization rate, sortie 
generation rate, etc.) to changes in reliability 
should be determined during design.  This will 
enable the program office/contractor to get 
maximum operational payoff from increasingly 
scarce funding by channeling available dollars 
towards reliability improvements that provide the 
most gain in operational capability. 
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Problem 
One system has keyed on high cost logistics 
support items for special emphasis in reliability 
improvement.  It turns out that there is not 
necessarily a correlation between high support 
cost and the sensitivity of support cost to 
reliability changes. 
Discussion 
For some equipment, our reliability and demand 
predictions can be far from the number seen in 
operational use and yet have no discernable 
effect on combat capability or logistics support.  
Other equipment will have an enormous effect on 
combat capability, support structure, mobility, 
manpower, or Life Cycle Costs (LCC).  The 
operational value of a system is proportional to 
its reliability or Mean Time Between Critical 
Failures (MTBCF).  Additional benefits accrue 
from lower spares and maintenance demands in the 
field.  Likewise, spares requirements may be so 
sensitive to Mean Time Between Demand (MTBD) that 
an error of a few hours can make the system 
unsupportable for lack of spares.  Knowing, early 
in the design phase, the sensitivity of such 
things as LCC, spares, availability, etc., to 
reliability will permit project engineers and 
logisticians to know where to put the emphasis on 
reliability improvements, prediction accuracy, 
etc. 
Recommended Action 
In the early portion of equipment design, program 
managers should perform, or require the 
contractor to perform, sensitivity analyses of 
operational goals to predict reliability 
parameters.  That equipment whose reliability 
parameters are shown to have large impact on the 
Air Force operational goals or spares 
requirements should receive increased engineering 
and management attention. 
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J. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The information about O&S Costs, LCC, reliability, and 
spares contained in the previous paragraphs will be used to 
highlight the problems and solutions contained in the 
thesis spreadsheet model described in the next chapter. 
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III. H-1 UPGRADE PROGRAM THESIS MODEL AND DATA  
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to expand on the 
concepts of reliability, LCC, and sparing presented in the 
previous chapter, and explain how they apply to the 
spreadsheet model used in this thesis.  This general 
framework will serve to highlight the sensitivity of spares 
levels and LCC to all these factors. 
B. THESIS SPREADSHEET MODEL DESCRIPTION 
From information gathered through research, a 
spreadsheet model for spares levels relating to operational 
availability and O&S costs at the H-1 Upgrade Program has 
been developed.  Specific components from the H-1 Upgrade 
Program were used to highlight sensitivity to mission 
critical spares areas.  Data from the Reliability and 
Maintainability (R&M) Office at Naval Air Systems Command 
(NAVAIR) and information from the H-1 Legacy systems 
program desk for the UH-1N and the AH-1W provided 
historical data. 
The time frame used in the model for the H-1 Upgrade 
Program is 20 years from Initial Operational Capability 
(IOC) which is estimated to be in 2007, since the Cost 
Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) has recommended this 
figure be used for rotary wing aircraft in their O&S Cost 
Estimating Guide. [From Ref 2]  An item of note, however, 
is that the AH-1Z and UH-1Y have been projected by some 
within the DoD to be in service for at least 30 years.  
This estimation is likely based on the historic precedent  
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of the CH-46 average service life currently approaching 40 
years and the UH-1N service life approaching an average of 
30 years. 
Lastly, to convert constant dollars to current dollars 
a normal discount rate of 3.2% was used.  This discount 
rate is the recommended rate from the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) Circular A-94 [Ref 12] for discounting 
costs of systems with a useful life of 20 years or more.  
The Budget and Financial Management (BFM) Office of NAVAIR 
estimates the future inflation rate will average 4% per 
year. 
1. Assumptions within the Spreadsheet Model 
The framework for the thesis spreadsheet model is 
based on an aviation logistics decision support spreadsheet 
model developed by Dr. Keebom Kang at the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  As with any model trying to emulate 
the working of a real world system, some assumptions about 
the operating environment need to be made to limit the 
external variables affecting the model.  Therefore, the 
following assumptions need to be taken into consideration 
when viewing the operation and results of the spreadsheet 
model presented here.  
a. Relationship Between MTBF and Repair Turn 
Around Time 
 First, it must be assumed within this thesis 
spreadsheet model that all repairs being conducted on 
components will be done at the I-Level.  This is a big 
assumption, but needs to be considered to make the Repair  
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TAT a more manageable figure.  This is also reasonable when 
evaluating the complexity of the critical spares being used 
as examples in the model. 
 Second, we must assume that failure times follow 
an exponential distribution. 
b. Circumstances Surrounding Component Failure 
 We must assume for our model that a component 
will only fail during operational use.  This does not take 
into consideration the real world problems of breakage 
during: installation, improper testing, packing, shipping, 
handling, and transportation. 
c. Aging Components 
 As any system proceeds through its life cycle, 
the aging of the components will tend to lead to shorter 
MTBF depending on whether the component is mechanical or 
electronic.  In our model, we will assume that, while 
mechanical, once a component is repaired it is considered 
to have the same MTBF as a new component. 
d. Levels of Maintenance 
 Within the model, we must assume that when the 
critical component fails, the failed item is removed from 
the aircraft at the O-Level.  Once removed, the squadron 
maintenance department turns in the faulty item, referred 
to as Non-Ready-For-Issue (Non-RFI), to the supply 
department at the I-Level, or MALS.  The MALS supply 
department, upon receipt of the Non-RFI item and a 
requisition for a Ready-For-Issue (RFI) spare for the 
squadron, then issues an RFI item from its storeroom (if 
one is available) and inducts the Non-RFI item into the 
MALS for repair.  If a spare is not immediately available 
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(a stock-out situation), the squadron may have to wait for 
the Non-RFI component to be repaired, decreasing aircraft 
availability and mission readiness. 
 Upon completion of repair, having issued a RFI 
spare to the squadron upon turn-in, the MALS returns the 
now RFI item to the supply department which receives and 
stores the item for future issue to the O-Level. 
 A Non-RFI repairable item the MALS is either 
unable or unauthorized to repair is considered Beyond the 
Capability of Maintenance (BCM) and returned to the supply 
department for shipment to the appropriate D-Level activity 
for repair.  When a BCM occurs, the supply department will 
attempt to acquire a replacement spare for the repairable 
item on a one-for-one basis as soon as possible from other 
I-Level sources or elsewhere within the Naval Supply 
System. 
2. Actual Levels of Maintenance within Marine Corps 
Aviation 
The following description of maintenance levels to be 
utilized by the H-1 Upgrade Program is necessary to 
understand the relationship between the formulas contained 
in the model and the outputs provided to the user.  
In Chapter II, we outlined the levels of maintenance 
in place and necessary to sustain a fielded USMC aviation 
system.  The Naval Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP) 
divides aviation maintenance into the following three 
levels:  
a. Operational Level Maintenance  
 O-Level maintenance is performed within the 
squadron that has custody of the aircraft and controls its 
  35
day-to-day operations.  The goal of O-Level maintenance is 
to support daily squadron operations by maintaining mission 
readiness and achieving the highest possible operational 
availability.  These measures are sometimes referred to as 
the Full Mission Capable (FMC) or Mission Capable (MC) 
rates.   
 FMC status is given to an aircraft that has all 
primary and secondary subsystems required for every 
possible mission scenario properly functioning, whereas MC 
status means that the aircraft has a subsystem or set of 
subsystems that are currently not functioning properly, but 
do not keep the aircraft from being flown for mission 
scenarios not requiring those subsystems.  The FMC and MC 
rates are frequently used by higher headquarters as a 
substitute for an Ao figure in a Squadron.      
b. Intermediate Level Maintenance  
 I-Level maintenance support for USMC aircraft is 
performed by Marine Aviation Logistics Squadrons (MALS) 
attached to each Marine Aircraft Group (MAG).   
 The MALS provides both direct and indirect 
support for the O-Level maintenance effort.  The goal of 
their I-Level maintenance facilities is to enhance and 
sustain the mission capability and readiness of supported 
units by providing high quality and timely support with the 
lowest practical expenditure of scarce resources.  This can 
be done in garrison, aboard ship, or during deployed 
operations. 
 Generally, one MALS supports one MAG, but the 
MALS may vary in size and organizational structure based on 
the number of squadrons and the associated 
Type/Model/Series (T/M/S) aircraft supported.   
 The MALS within the rotary wing side of Marine 
aviation supports all the T/M/S aircraft that a MAG is 
fielding to support the Marine Air Wing (MAW) or the MAGTF.   
For example, a MALS facility at Marine Corps Air Station 
(MCAS) New River, North Carolina services the needs of one 
HMLA squadron which currently flies nine UH-1N and eighteen 
AH-1W helicopters, one Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 
(HMH) which flies twelve CH-53E helicopters, and three 
Marine Medium Helicopter squadrons (HMM) which each fly 
twelve CH-46E helicopters for a total of 75 aircraft.  
Table 1 gives a breakdown of the MALS support for the AH-1W 
helicopters at the HMLA. 
 
 
Type of Navy Aircraft (TMS) AH-1W
Base Year of the Analysis 2002
Number of AH-1W Aircraft in HMLA 167 18
Flight Hours per Month 20.22
NAO Officer Percentage Applied 75%
NAO Enlisted Percentage Applied 100%
Percent of Consumables Used at the Squadron 78%
Percent of Consumables Used at the MALS 22%
Percent of  MALS Workload for AH-1W 11%
Number of AH-1W Squadrons at the MALS 1.5                   
Number of Squadrons Supported by MAG 26 6








Table 1.   MALS AH-1W Support [From Ref 9.] 
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 A similar table for the UH-1N aircraft supported 
by the MALS shows a 6% rate for “Percent of MALS workload 
for UH-1N.”  Overall, this 17% of the MALS workload taken 
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up by the HMLA corresponds to the percentage of AH-1Ws and 
UH-1Ns supported by this MALS.   
 During Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) 
deployments of detachments from the MAG (usually consisting 
of one HMM squadron augmented by one-third of an HMH and 
one-third of an HMLA) the MALS will send a large number of 
specialized personnel to augment the Navy’s Aircraft 
Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD) found aboard 
helicopter-carrying ships.  This is also true for Special 
Purpose MAGTFs (SPMAGTFs) that may take more or less MALS 
personnel and equipment depending on the force structure 
dictated by the mission. 
c. Depot Level Maintenance 
 In this model, we do not consider D-Level 
maintenance other than to state that it is included in 
overall repair time of repairable spares.  This is because 
there is not a significant impact on the operational 
availability of fielded systems due to work conducted at 
the depot other than delays caused by work in process (WIP) 
times.  This is an additional area of study briefly touched 
on in this thesis that could have a major impact on 
operational availability and mission readiness.  Currently, 
studies are being conducted at NAVAIR and NPS to evaluate 
the cost savings, increased operational availability, and 
enhanced mission readiness achievable through increased 
investment in improvements at the D-Level.    
 The goal of D-Level maintenance is to support O-
Level and I-Level maintenance activities.  This is done by 
performing repairs beyond the capability of maintenance 
(BCM) of the lower maintenance levels, usually on equipment 
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requiring major overhaul or rebuilding of end items, 
assemblies, and parts.  D-Level activities are tasked to 
ensure the continued flight integrity and safety of 
airframes and related flight systems throughout their 
service life. 
 For USMC aviation assets, D-Level maintenance is 
usually performed at Naval Aviation Depots (NADEPs).  
However, an increasing trend is to contract out the D-Level 
maintenance to other military services or to private 
industry capable of performing the work. 
 As an example, certain components are sent to D-
Level repair at the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM).  
One example of this practice is the D-Level maintenance on 
the T-700 engine which is done at the OEM, General Electric 
Aircraft Engines (GEAE).  This practice has become more 
common because of the expertise and cost savings available 
at the equipment’s point of origin thanks to the 
specialized equipment and personnel there. 
3. Thesis Spreadsheet Model Input Variable 
Description 
 The following parameters are user-defined inputs into 
the thesis spreadsheet model: 
a. Number of Aircraft 
 Within the thesis spreadsheet model, we need to 
specify how many aircraft the spares assigned to each I-
Level activity (MALS) is supporting. 
b. Critical Components Considered 
 Within the thesis spreadsheet model we will 
consider the maintenance of only a few components and their 
spares.  These components will be critical, repairable 
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components without which the aircraft cannot operate.  
Chosen for this thesis spreadsheet model are the engines, 
combining gearbox (which takes the power generated by both 
engines and combines it to drive the main drive shaft), the 
main transmission, and the main rotor blades.  How many 
spares will be available for each of these critical 
components is based on figures supplied by the H-1 program 
office.   
c. Failure Rate 
 Within the model we assume that the critical 
component fails with a constant rate of 1/MTBF or λ, 
following a Poisson distribution.  The failure rate input 
is based on historical data, manufacturers predicted 
reliability, or is an artificial figure used for comparison 
purposes as described in each of the scenarios.   
C. O&S COSTS BREAKDOWN 
Members of the H-1 Upgrade program and the NAVAIR 
Budget and Financial Management (BFM) office provided the 
O&S and component costs contained in this thesis. 
While most of the costs are accurate with regard to 
established components, some are estimates of unit costs 
that may change through economies of scale or design 
improvements.  An example of this is the General Electric 
(GE) T700-401 engine, which will be common to the AH-1Z and 
the UH-1Y, and is currently being used by the AH-1W.  
Additionally, average annual maintenance costs per failure 
are estimated for components on the Upgrade Program based 
on current cost per failure of similar components on the 
AH-1W.   
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D. SPARES LEVELS OF CRITICAL COMPONENTS 
Critical components must be described as those without 
which the overall system cannot function, an example being 
an engine, a main rotor blade, or a transmission.  
Components not considered critical to operation, such as 
certain fasteners, electronic components, or mission kits 
may still degrade overall mission capability if not readily 
available, but will not preclude all operations. 
In calculating the spare parts levels for critical 
components, it is important to highlight the sensitivity of 
the overall Life Cycle Cost to small fluctuations in 
reliability. 
It is in this area that all members of the H-1 Upgrade 
program specifically and the Naval acquisition field in 
general, need to focus their attention while completing the 
test and evaluation (T&E) phase of EMD.  Nowhere else can 
the small decisions concerning improved reliability so 
greatly affect the overall cost of the program. 
E. PROTECTION LEVEL 
Protection against stock-out is a primary concern for 
the logistician and must be balanced against the cost of 
the component.  Therefore a protection level of 100% is 
rarely used.  For higher priced components, a calculated 
risk must be taken to balance scarce resources against the 
requirement for mission success.  Within the scenarios for 
our analysis, we will vary the protection levels to 




F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The information provided in this chapter was meant to 
carry the reader from the macro view of the calculations 
presented in Chapter II to the more discrete application of 
those calculations in the spreadsheet model that will be 
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter will utilize the information presented in 
Chapters II and III to draw conclusions based on the 
interaction of data entered into the spreadsheet model.  
Additionally, detailed explanation will be given about the 
calculations used within the spreadsheet model. 
B. SIMULATION OF H-1 UPGRADE PROGRAM MODEL 
The spreadsheet model described here has the 
limitations and assumptions described in Chapter III.  
There is, however, enough detail and interaction between 
the variables to give a reasonable estimation of spares 
levels and LCC for the critical components being analyzed.   
The detailed description of the model will be expanded on 
in this discussion of discrete variable inputs.   
1. User-Defined Variable Input Parameters 
In the spreadsheet model, accurate user defined 
inputs, as explained in Chapter II, play an important role 
in determining whether the model will be an effective tool 
for determining the relationship between reliability 
estimations, spares levels, and Life Cycle Cost. 
The parameters in the following paragraphs will be 
used when inserting user-defined variables and can be seen 
in the visual representation of the spreadsheet in Appendix 
A. 
a. Aircraft Per Squadron (K) 
 The number of aircraft supported by the typical 
I-Level activity (MALS) should be input.  An example can be 
seen in Table 2.  If the calculations are used to ensure 
spares coverage for a detachment of aircraft, then all 
other user-defined inputs should reflect the deployed 
nature of the variables.   
 For the analysis conducted by this thesis, we 
will utilize the average number of aircraft supported by 
one MALS, which is 18 for the AH-1W or AH-1Z, and 9 for the 
UH-1N or UH-1Y.  However, since the AH-1Z and UH-1Y will 
share over 80% of their spares, spares protection levels of 
the critical components cited here will need to reflect the 
fact that they are supporting the combination of both T/M/S 
during calculations.  For this reason, the number of 
aircraft being supported by the MALS will be 27 to 








Type of Navy Aircraft (TMS) AH-1W
Base Year of the Analysis 2002
Number of AH-1W Aircraft in HMLA 167 18
Flight Hours per Month 20.22
NAO Officer Percentage Applied 75%
NAO Enlisted Percentage Applied 100%
Percent of Consumables Used at the Squadron 78%
Percent of Consumables Used at the MALS 22%
Percent of  MALS Workload for AH-1W 11%
Number of AH-1W Squadrons at the MALS 1.5                   
Number of Squadrons Supported by MAG 26 6
Number of Squadrons Supported by 2nd MAW 30
Table 2.   MALS AH-1W Support [From Ref 9] 
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 In order to calculate the cost for the entire 
Fleet, the “Acquisition Profile” worksheet for each 
component takes into consideration the entire quantity of 
aircraft fielded in a given FY based on the current Program 
purchase baseline. 
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b. Monthly Flight Hours (t) 
 This variable has a direct effect on our model as 
the failure rate will use this variable to generate spares 
levels and LCCs.  We will input the average annual 
operating hours for the T/M/S being analyzed.  Currently, 
the AH-1W and UH-1N are shown to have an annual operation 
time of 243 hours based on a monthly operation time of 
20.22 hours per supported aircraft as shown in Table 2. 
 The Number of flight hours per month is an 
average, based on historical data, used by support 
activities to determine supportability requirements.  The 
historical average does not take into account accelerated 
aircraft usage caused by contingency operations.  During 
the course of our analysis, we will vary the monthly 
average flight time to determine the effect of continuous 
contingency operations on LCC and required spares.     
c. Mean Flight Hours Between Failures (MFHBF) 
 Reliability figures for components must have a 
basis in time for their determination.  Different systems 
use a variety of measurements such as wall clock hours, 
engine hours, or in our case, flight hours. 
 Aircraft component manufacturers usually espouse 
a particular MFHBF for their components as a reference that 
can be easily compared with the usage on the aircraft (see 
monthly flight hours above).   
 Flight hours are a fairly accurate time 
measurement for larger components associated with aviation 
operations.  Their life can be tracked through the 
maintenance documents that associate them with a particular 
airframe.  The flight hours are recorded by the pilots upon 
  46
their return from a given mission and entered into the 
aircraft’s logbook through the NALCOMIS system.  What this 
does not take into account, however, is the time that the 
aircraft is turning its engines and dynamic components on 
the ground before flight, after flight, and during test 
procedures. 
 Some components, such as some electronic devices, 
have built in clocks (which record the elapsed time 
whenever the equipment has power applied) for more accurate 
life cycle time measurements.  The lack of accurate 
recorded time on the critical components studied in this 
thesis brings to light one of the real world variables that 
the model cannot duplicate.   
d. Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) 
 As stated above, the most common reliability 
figure given by an aircraft component manufacturer is 
MFHBF.  In our spreadsheet, however, we need to convert 
this to a calendar reference (days) to make the association 
between the monthly average flight hours flown and the 
failure rate described below.  This is done in the 
spreadsheet by taking the MFHBF and dividing it by the 
average monthly flight hours and multiplying by 30 days.  
The resulting figure gives the average number of days 
between failures of that component.          
e. Failure Rate (λ) 
 This variable is the key to our analysis.  We 
will input the variables used by the H-1 Upgrade Program 
for budgetary projections.  An example of how this data is 
tracked is provided in Table 3.  Any changes made to the  
reliability estimations given by the H-1 Upgrade program 
for comparison in the analysis scenarios will be within +/- 




UC 22 Turboshaft Engines
YEAR FLT HRS
# Maint 
Actions # Failures MFHBMA MFHBF Failure Rate # MMH
MMH PER 
FLT HR EMT MTTR
1990 14649 917 331 15.97 44.26 0.022596 3114 0.213 1803 1.97
1991 18546 1156 492 16.04 37.69 0.026529 5606 0.302 2731 2.36
1992 26081 1257 514 20.75 50.74 0.019708 7147 0.274 2840 2.26
1993 23453 1245 506 18.84 46.35 0.021575 6887 0.294 2648 2.13
1994 29885 2156 734 13.86 40.72 0.024561 9331 0.312 4499 2.09
1995 34952 2770 955 12.62 36.60 0.027323 11551 0.330 5798 2.09
1996 33171 3268 986 10.15 33.64 0.029725 13123 0.396 7792 2.38
1997 31602 1675 811 18.87 38.97 0.025663 9228 0.292 3461 2.07
1998 35508 1914 994 18.55 35.72 0.027994 8136 0.229 3542 1.85
1999 36208 2569 1148 14.09 31.54 0.031706 10750 0.297 4746 1.85
2000 37124 2008 948 18.49 39.16 0.025536 8102 0.218 3768 1.88







Table 3.   AH-1W GE T700-401 Engine Reliability 
and Maintainability History [After Ref 14] 
Average 29888.58 1893.75 773.8333 16.59797 39.88519 0.025504 8592.083 0.285608 3960.333 2.091367
  
 Additionally, the estimations of reliability for 
the improved engines and other dynamic components in our 
analysis being procured for the H-1 Upgrade Program are 
still under evaluation as the AH-1Z and UH-1Y undergo 
Operational Testing.  Therefore, the estimated MTBF figures 
used in the comparative scenarios are based upon 
information gleaned from the prime contractor and the 
program office. 
f. Repair Turn Around Time (TAT) in Days  
 This user defined input is based on historical 
figures such as those provided by the H-1 Program for T-700 
engines in Table 3, and will vary for different components.   
g. Failure Per Squadron During TAT 
 These calculations are generated by multiplying 
the number of aircraft in a squadron by the failure rate 
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and then multiplying by the Repair TAT.  This is our first 
indication of whether sparing will keep pace with demand.  
If the number is less than one, then the pipeline numbers 
will remain low because the repairable component inducted 
by the MALS will be returned to the shelf before the next 
incident of component demand, reducing the probability of a 
stock-out situation. 
h.  Failures Per Squadron Per Year 
 Taking the calculation for one calendar year 
divided by MTBF (converted to days) and then multiplied by 
the number of aircraft per Squadron will give us the 
estimate for the number of component failures the squadron 
should expect during the year.  This calculation will be 
used to multiply by the cost per repair to build the 
overall LCC for each component. 
i.  Protection Level 
 This user-defined input is based on the level of 
risk acceptable to the procuring activity for determining 
how many spares will be procured to avoid a stock out 
condition.  The higher the protection level, the higher the 
cost to procure the number of spares required for the 
desired in-stock levels.   
 Generally, the dynamic components discussed in 
this thesis will have a protection level of 85%, which is 
the baseline protection level of expensive critical 
components.  During the course of our analysis, we will 
vary this figure to highlight its impact on LCC. 
j.  Required Spares Based on Poisson Calculation 
 This figure is used as a comparison to actual 
spares purchased.  The calculation is based on the variable 
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input by the user, which is then translated into the 
Poisson calculation on the back worksheet of the overall 
spreadsheet model.   
 A Poisson table is included for the calculation 
of this figure.   
k.  Unit Acquisition Cost 
 This user-defined input is taken from cost 
estimations provided by the program office.  For components 
without a current equivalent in another platform, the 
historical data for the UH-1N and AH-1W or from cost 
estimates for the UH-1Y and AH-1Z provided by the H-1 
Upgrade program will be input.  Realistically, this cost 
could change in the future, affecting O&S costs, through 
price increases from technical difficulties or price 
decreases though economies of scale, etc. 
l.  Average Annual Maintenance Cost Per Failure 
 The figures inserted into this field are based on 
support costs paid by NAVICP for each D-Level failure of 
the component being analyzed.  This user-defined input is 
taken from historical data provided by the H-1 Upgrade 
Program.  It describes the costs to the program for 
overhead associated with developing I-Level maintenance 
support for the component being analyzed.  This variable 
will be held constant throughout our analysis.  
m.  Average Total Annual Maintenance Cost 
 This figure is based on the average annual 
maintenance cost listed above times the failures per 
squadron per year and on historical data provided by the H-
1 Upgrade Program.  It is the annual cost associated with 
I-Level maintenance support for the component being 
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analyzed.  This variable will be held constant during our 
analysis, but could vary greatly and affect LCC should 
technical difficulties increase this variable or support 
improvements decrease it. 
n.  Initial Spares Purchase Cost Per Squadron 
 This figure is the number of spares required per 
squadron multiplied by the acquisition cost per unit.  This 
will feed into the LCC figure described below. 
o.  Total Component 20 Year LCC 
 The figure displayed in this cell is a sum from 
the Acquisition Profile sheets for each component.  This is 
the second metric that will display the sensitivity of 
changes in reliability.   
 The magnitude of these figures were staggering at 
first, until I realized that these cost were covering 
maintenance and spares for an entire fleet of aircraft over 
their service life.  Unfortunately, higher headquarters 
personnel who want to produce the most capability with the 
smallest investment rarely consider this high cost.  
Hopefully, this thesis will give a glimpse of these costs 
and help us all understand that an investment in 
reliability makes fiscal and operational sense for the 
warfighters and the budget analysts.   
p.  Fiscal Year and Years of Operation 
 These place-marks will help us to track the 
program over time and understand the cost growth as new 
aircraft are added to the inventory, steady out, and then 




q.  Total Aircraft Produced Per Year 
 This figure will be a representation of the total 
number of AH-1Z and UH-1Y aircraft purchased by the Marine 
Corps during each fiscal year.  The cumulative number is 
used because the components being discussed are common to 
both platforms. 
r.  Total Aircraft Inventory 
 The figure in this cell is the total aircraft 
expected to be in service during the fiscal year cited.  
This is important because the spares levels need to be 
matched to the entire fleet of aircraft rather than just 
those purchased that year. 
s.  I-Level Spares Purchased During Fiscal Year 
 This figure is the number of spare components 
that will need to be purchased per squadron as they are 
stood up.  All the items are repairable, but must continue 
to be purchased (at a slower rate) after all squadrons have 
been stood up due to attrition. 
t.  Initial Spares Purchase 
 The figure use on the “Acquisition Profile” 
worksheets are the same as the figures use on the 
“Analysis” worksheet, but will be used to generate the LCC 
of the individual components. 
 This figure is the acquisition cost of the spares 
multiplied by the number of spares purchased in the given 




u.  Annual Maintenance Cost 
 This figure is the annual maintenance cost of the 
particular component associated with all the aircraft that 
are currently fielded in the fiscal year cited by the 
estimate. 
v.  Total Cost (FY2004) 
 This cost is the simple addition of the Initial 
Spares Purchase Cost and the Annual Maintenance Cost for 
the fiscal year being cited.  This cost will then be 
modified through proper accounting method in the following 
cells.    
w.  Cost with Inflation (Then Year) 
 This figure takes into consideration the 
Inflation Rate mentioned below.  It is important to 
understand the costs that will take place in each fiscal 
year and how they are estimated to increase as they get 
further and further out from the present.    
x.  Present Value (FY2004) 
 This is equivalent to the value if the costs were 
paid today to meet the needs of the future warfighters.  It 
is the sum of these values over the total fiscal years 
cited that will give us our Net Present Value listed below.   
y.  Net Present Value (NPV) 
 The Net Present Value is the sum of the Present 
Value figures mentioned above and will also be interpreted 
as the LCC for the component being analyzed.  This total 
gives the Program Manager and logisticians on the H-1 
Program a snap-shot of what price we would pay for all the 
spares and their maintenance if we had to put all the money 
down today. 
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z.  Inflation Rate 
 This user-defined input is derived from an 
estimate of inflation in the United States which the H-1 
Upgrade Program will have to contend with during all of its 
budgeting.  The program is currently using an inflation 
estimate of 4%. 
aa. Discount Rate 
 The discount rate input into the spreadsheet 
calculations here is based on the discount rate recommended 
by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A94. 
[From Ref 12]  
C. SCENARIOS USED FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
To limit the amount of variables being changed during 
each analysis, the analysis of the spreadsheet model was 
broken down into four scenarios:  
• Scenario 1: By using present estimations of MTBF, 
program provided O&S costs, and other support inputs 
in relation to the components for the AH-1Z and UH-
1Y, we will derive a baseline LCC for comparison 
with scenarios 2, 3, and 4.  
• Scenario 2:  In order to determine the significance 
of a higher than expected failure rate (lower MTBF 
or decreased reliability) on the spares level 
protection and LCC, we will use scenario 2 as a 
contrast to the estimated figures presented by the 
program office in scenario 1.  This will highlight 
the changes in spares levels and O&S costs of a 20% 
decrease in the reliability of each of the 
components analyzed. 
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• Scenario 3:  This scenario will use scenario 1 
baseline reliability figures and cost, but utilize 
higher protection levels to highlight the price of 
bringing higher operational availability (FMC/MC 
rates) to the warfighters.     
• Scenario 4:  In this scenario we will attempt to 
analyze the impact of an increase in flight hours 
that could occur during sustained contingency 
operations (similar to the current Global War On 
Terrorism).  This will be broken down into two 
parts: 
1. Scenario 4a, which will be using scenario 
1 reliability figures.  
2. Scenario 4b, which will use scenario 2 
figures to highlight the potentially 
compounding problem of less reliable 
components being used more often than 
expected. 
1.  Scenario 1: Current Estimates of Reliability, 
 Peacetime Operational Tempo   
To have a foundation for the comparative analysis in 
this thesis, the use of H-1 Program provided reliability 
and cost data allows a benchmark to be set.  Many of these 
values are taken from historical data associated with the 
AH-1W because there is not enough data available on the 
systems currently being flown on the AH-1Z and UH-1Y.   
a.  Scenario 1 User-defined Input Values 
 The user-defined inputs below will describe the 
values dictated by the given scenario.   
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 There are two separate worksheets that are 
described here in scenario 1, specifically the “Analysis” 
worksheet and the “Acquisition Profile” worksheet.  The 
user-defined inputs on the acquisition profile worksheet 
will not change from scenario to scenario due to the 
current H-1 Upgrade acquisition program baseline (how many 
aircraft and spare parts will be purchased during a given 
year) being unchanged with the scenario variables selected. 
• Number of Aircraft* (combined AH-1Z Cobras 
and UH-1Y Hueys per HMLA due to shared 
components): 27                
* will not change between scenarios 
• Monthly Flight Hours (per aircraft): 22  
• MFHBF in hours:  
o Engine: 100 
o Combining Gearbox: 2500 
o Transmission: 5000 
o Main Rotor Blades: 550   
• MTBF (in days, calculated from MFHBF): 
o Engine: 136.36 
o Combining Gearbox: 3409.09 
o Transmission: 6818.18 
o Main Rotor Blades: 750   
• Failure Rate per day (λ, calculated from 
MTBF): 
o Engine: 0.00733 
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o Combining Gearbox: 0.00029 
o Transmission: 0.00015 
o Main Rotor Blades: 0.00133   
• Repair TAT in days*: 
o Engine: 5 
o Combining Gearbox: 45 
o Transmission: 60 
o Main Rotor Blades: 30   
* will not change between scenarios 
• Expected Number of Failures/Squadron during 
TAT: 
o Engine: 0.99 
o Combining Gearbox: 0.36 
o Transmission: 0.24 
o Main Rotor Blades: 1.08   
• Expected Number of Failures/Squadron/Year: 
o Engine: 72.27 
o Combining Gearbox: 2.98 
o Transmission: 1.45 
o Main Rotor Blades: 13.14   
• Target Protection Level for Each Component: 
o Engine: 0.85 
o Combining Gearbox: 0.85 
o Transmission: 0.85 
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o Main Rotor Blades: 0.85 
• Unit Acquisition Cost*: 
o Engine: $695,000 
o Combining Gearbox: $476,000 
o Transmission: $930,000 
o Main Rotor Blades: $233,000 
• Average Annual Maintenance Cost/Failure*: 
o  Engine: $85,000 
o Combining Gearbox: $50,000 
o Transmission: $200,000 
o Main Rotor Blades: $15,000 
* will not change between scenarios 
 
• Total Aircraft Produced/Year*: see tables 8 
and 10, Appendix A 
• Initial Spares Purchased*: see tables 8 and 
10, Appendix A 
• Inflation Rate*: 3.2% 
• Discount Rate*: 4.0% 
* will not change between scenarios 
 These values were placed in the appropriate cells 
in the analysis and the acquisition profile worksheets of 
the spreadsheet model depicted in Appendix A and provide 
the following results.  
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b.  Scenario 1 Analysis Worksheet Output  
 The calculations incorporated into the 
spreadsheet to develop the user-defined values into the 
required spares and the LCC provided the following critical 
component analysis.   
• Required Spares: (calculated from the 
relation between Failures/Squadron during 
TAT and Protection Level) 
o Engine: 3 
o Combining Gearbox: 1 
o Transmission: 1 
o Main Rotor Blades: 3 
• Sparing Based on Poisson Calculations: 
o Engine: 2 
o Combining Gearbox: 1 
o Transmission: 1  
o Main Rotor Blades: 2 
• Average Total Annual Maintenance Cost: 
o Engine: $6,142,950 
o Combining Gearbox: $144,540 
o Transmission: $289,080 
o Main Rotor Blades: $197,100 
• Initial Spares Purchase Cost/Squadron: 
o Engine: $2,085,000 
o Combining Gearbox: $476,000 
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o Transmission: $930,000 
o Main Rotor Blades: $699,000 
• Total Component 20 Year LCC: 
o Engine: $187,930,428 
o Combining Gearbox: $22,704,857 
o Transmission: $38,086,790 
o Main Rotor Blades: $38,041,454 
• Combined 4-Component LCC: $286,763,529 
 The tables in Appendix A are taken from this 
scenario and provide a visual representation of the figures 
above.  Analysis of these figures is provided in paragraph 
D “Analysis of Results” below. 
2.  Scenario 2: Decreased Reliability, Peacetime 
 Operational Tempo 
 In order to determine the significance of 
decreased reliability (a higher than expected failure rate 
or lower MTBF) on the spares level and component LCC, we 
will use scenario 2 as a contrast to the estimated figures 
presented by the program office in scenario 1.  This 
scenario will highlight the changes in spares levels and 
O&S costs of a 20% decrease in the reliability of each of 
the components analyzed.   
a.  Scenario 2 User-defined Input Values  
 Only user-defined input values that have changed 
between scenario 1 and scenario 2 will be noted. 
• MFHBF in hours:  
o Engine: 80 
  60
o Combining Gearbox: 2000 
o Transmission: 4000 
o Main Rotor Blades: 440   
• MTBF (in days, calculated from MFHBF): 
o Engine: 109.09 
o Combining Gearbox: 2727.27 
o Transmission: 5454.55 
o Main Rotor Blades: 600   
• Failure Rate per day (λ, calculated from 
MFHBF): 
o Engine: 0.00917 
o Combining Gearbox: 0.00037 
o Transmission: 0.00018 
o Main Rotor Blades: 0.00167   
• Expected Number of Failures/Squadron during 
TAT: 
o Engine: 1.24 
o Combining Gearbox: 0.45 
o Transmission: 0.30 
o Main Rotor Blades: 1.35   
• Expected Number of Failures/Squadron/Year: 
o Engine: 90.34 
o Combining Gearbox: 3.61 
o Transmission: 1.81 
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o Main Rotor Blades: 16.43  
 These values were placed in the appropriate cells 
in the analysis and the acquisition profile worksheets of 
the spreadsheet model depicted in Appendix A and provide 
the following results. 
b.  Scenario 2 Analysis Worksheet Output  
 The calculations incorporated into the 
spreadsheet to develop the user-defined values into the 
required spares and the LCC provided the following critical 
component analysis.   
• Required Spares: (calculated from the 
relation between Failures/Squadron during 
TAT and Protection Level) 
o Engine: 3 
o Combining Gearbox: 2 
o Transmission: 1 
o Main Rotor Blades: 3 
• Sparing Based on Poisson Calculations: 
o Engine: 2 
o Combining Gearbox: 1 
o Transmission: 1  
o Main Rotor Blades: 3 
• Average Total Annual Maintenance Cost: 
o Engine: $7,687,688 
o Combining Gearbox: $180,675 
o Transmission: $361,350 
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o Main Rotor Blades: $246,375 
• Initial Spares Purchase Cost/Squadron: 
o Engine: $2,085,000 
o Combining Gearbox: $952,000 
o Transmission: $930,000 
o Main Rotor Blades: $699,000 
• Total Component 20 Year LCC: 
o Engine: $213,724,766 
o Combining Gearbox: $23,311,782 
o Transmission: $39,300,641 
o Main Rotor Blades: $39,869,080 
• Combined 4-Component LCC: $315,206,269 
 Analysis of these figures is provided in 
paragraph D “Analysis of Results” below. 
3.  Scenario 3: Increased Spares Protection Levels, 
 Peacetime Operational Tempo 
This scenario will use scenario 1 baseline reliability 
figures and cost, but utilize higher protection levels to 
highlight the cost of bringing higher operational 
availability (FMC/MC rates) to the warfighters. 
a.  Scenario 3 User-defined Input Values  
 Only user-defined input values that have changed 
between scenario 1 and scenario 3 will be noted. 
• Protection Level: 
o Engine: 0.95 
o Combining Gearbox: 0.95 
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o Transmission: 0.95 
o Main Rotor Blades: 0.95   
 These values were placed in the appropriate cells 
in the analysis and the acquisition profile worksheets of 
the spreadsheet model depicted in Appendix A and provide 
the following results. 
b. Scenario 3 Analysis Worksheet Output  
 The calculations incorporated into the 
spreadsheet to develop the user-defined values into the 
required spares and the LCC provided the following critical 
component analysis.   
• Required Spares: (calculated from the 
relation between Failures/Squadron during 
TAT and Protection Level) 
o Engine: 3  
o Combining Gearbox: 2 
o Transmission: 2 
o Main Rotor Blades: 3 
• Sparing Based on Poisson Calculations: 
o Engine: 2 
o Combining Gearbox: 1 
o Transmission: 1  
o Main Rotor Blades: 2 
• Average Total Annual Maintenance Cost: 
o Engine: $6,142,950 
o Combining Gearbox: $144,540 
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o Transmission: $289,080 
o Main Rotor Blades: $197,100 
• Initial Spares Purchase Cost/Squadron: 
o Engine: $2,085,000 
o Combining Gearbox: $952,000 
o Transmission: $1,860,000 
o Main Rotor Blades: $699,000 
• Total Component 20 Year LCC: 
o Engine: $205,406,167 
o Combining Gearbox: $22,704,857 
o Transmission: $46,365,367 
o Main Rotor Blades: $45,868,417 
• Combined 4-Component LCC: $320,344,807 
 Analysis of these figures is provided in 
paragraph D “Analysis of Results” below.  
4.  Scenario 4: Varying Estimates of Reliability, 
 Increased Operational Tempo 
In this scenario we will attempt to analyze the impact 
of an increase in flight hours that could occur during 
sustained contingency operations similar to the current 
Global War On Terrorism.  This will be broken down into two 
parts:  Scenario 4a which will be using scenario 1 
reliability figures with a 35% increase in monthly flight 
hours, and scenario 4b which will use the decreased 
reliability figures of scenario 2 and a 35% increase in 
monthly flight hours to highlight the compound problem of 
less reliable components be used more often than expected. 
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There is a great deal of difficulty in estimating O&S 
cost when flight hours are higher than expected.  As 
explained in the NAVAIR O&S Handbook from FY02: [Ref 8] 
All unit level consumption elements are first 
normalized to a cost per flight hour.   This is 
because POL, O&I-Level consumables, Aviation 
Depot Level Repairs (AVDLRs) and Training 
Expendables are usually thought of in terms of 
the quantity used per operating hour, and, by 
extension, cost per flight hour.   Additionally, 
the normalized value would not change with an 
increase or decrease in the number of flight 
hours flown in a given period of time.   We 
would, however, expect a squadron’s annual cost 
for these elements to increase if it flew more 
hours.   Normalizing consumable costs first to a 
flight hour basis allows the model to readily 
estimate changes in the annual cost per squadron 
caused by corresponding changes in the flight 
hours flown per year. 
Although most spare parts levels are based on steady-
state flight hours under peacetime conditions, there is 
always thought given to the increased demands on aircraft 
during contingency operations. 
This thesis is being written during the build-up to, 
and the disarming of Iraq in the spring of 2003.  The 
current AH-1W and UH-1N will undoubtedly be required to 
operate at far greater than their normal peacetime flight 
hours while operations in theater.   
Contingency spares packages have been put into place 
on each of the amphibious ships that these airframes are 
deployed on and any contingency force sent to a potential 
conflict will carry with them as many spares as they can 
muster.  But what will this do to the normal spares 
pipeline?  Since the spares ordering process can take up to 
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six months, and in some cases almost two years from start 
to finish, will the warfighters have all the parts they 
need to accomplish their missions and keep their readiness 
at the level necessary to achieve mission success? 
These surge operations are the true test of the 
accuracy of the program’s reliability estimations and will 
ultimately help or hurt the warfighters mission 
accomplishment. 
a.  Scenario 4a (Increased Flight Hours) User-
 defined Input Values  
 This scenario will keep user-defined variables 
other than annual flight hours unchanged compared to 
scenario 1.   
• Monthly Flight Hours (per aircraft): 30  
• MFHBF in hours:  
o Engine: 100 
o Combining Gearbox: 2500 
o Transmission: 5000 
o Main Rotor Blades: 550   
• MTBF (in days, calculated from MFHBF): 
o Engine: 100 
o Combining Gearbox: 2500 
o Transmission: 5000 
o Main Rotor Blades: 550   
• Failure Rate per day(λ, calculated from 
MFHBF): 
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o Engine: 0.01 
o Combining Gearbox: 0.0004 
o Transmission: 0.0002 
o Main Rotor Blades: 0.00182    
• Failures/Squadron during TAT: 
o Engine: 1.35 
o Combining Gearbox: 0.49 
o Transmission: 0.32 
o Main Rotor Blades: 1.47   
• Failures/Squadron/Year: 
o Engine: 98.55 
o Combining Gearbox: 3.94 
o Transmission: 1.97 
o Main Rotor Blades: 17.92   
 These values were produced once the increased 
flight hours were placed in the appropriate cells in the 
analysis and the acquisition profile worksheets of the 
spreadsheet model depicted in Appendix A.  They provide the 
following results. 
b.  Scenario 4a Analysis Worksheet Output  
 The calculations incorporated into the 
spreadsheet to develop the user-defined values into the 
required spares and the LCC provided the following critical 
component analysis.   
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• Required Spares: (calculated from the 
relation between Failures/Squadron during 
TAT and Protection Level) 
o Engine: 3 
o Combining Gearbox: 2 
o Transmission: 1 
o Main Rotor Blades: 3 
• Sparing Based on Poisson Calculations: 
o Engine: 3 
o Combining Gearbox: 1 
o Transmission: 1 
o Main Rotor Blades: 3 
• Average Total Annual Maintenance Cost: 
o Engine: $8,376,750 
o Combining Gearbox: $197,100 
o Transmission: $394,200 
o Main Rotor Blades: $268,773 
• Initial Spares Purchase Cost: 
o Engine: $2,085,000 
o Combining Gearbox: $952,000 
o Transmission: $930,000 
o Main Rotor Blades: $699,000 
• Total Component 20 Year LCC: 
o Engine: $225,449,465 
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o Combining Gearbox: $23,587,658 
o Transmission: $39,852,392 
o Main Rotor Blades: $39,245,273 
• Combined 4-Component LCC: $328,134,787 
 Analysis of these figures is provided in 
paragraph D “Analysis of Results” below. 
c.  Scenario 4b (Increased Flight Hours and 
 Decrease Reliability) User-defined Input 
 Values  
 Using the contingency operating hours described 
in scenario 4a plus the reliability figures used in 
scenario 2, we will highlight the potentially compounding 
problem associated with higher than expected operating 
hours coupled with lower than expected reliability figures. 
 Only user-defined input values that have changed 
between scenario 2 and scenario 4b will be noted. 
• Monthly Flight Hours (per aircraft): 30  
• MFHBF in hours:  
o Engine: 80 
o Combining Gearbox: 2000 
o Transmission: 4000 
o Main Rotor Blades: 440    
 These values were placed in the appropriate cells 
in the analysis and the acquisition profile worksheets of 
the spreadsheet model depicted in Appendix A and provide 
the following results. 
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d.  Scenario 4b Analysis Worksheet Output  
 The calculations incorporated into the 
spreadsheet to develop the user-defined values into the 
required spares and the LCC provided the following critical 
component analysis.   
• Required Spares: (calculated from the 
relation between Failures/Squadron during 
TAT and Protection Level) 
o Engine: 4 
o Combining Gearbox: 2 
o Transmission: 2 
o Main Rotor Blades: 4 
• Sparing Based on Poisson Calculations: 
o Engine: 3 
o Combining Gearbox: 1 
o Transmission: 1  
o Main Rotor Blades: 3 
• Combined 4-Component LCC: $366,920,342 
 Analysis of these figures is provided in 
paragraph D “Analysis of Results” below.  
D. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
As has been shown through the various scenarios 
presented in this thesis, it is the reliability figures 
that are the most important in the relationship between 
spares levels, protection levels, and O&S costs.  The 
analyses of the results above highlight this fact and were 
a revelation to the author. 
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1. Scenario 1, Current Reliability Estimates, 
Peacetime Operational Tempo 
• Combined 4-Component LCC: $286,763,529 (baseline) 
Since the figures used in the model were the historic 
figures provided by the program, we expected to achieve an 
output similar to levels seen within the program for recent 
years.  Through discussions with various members of the H-1 
Program Team at PMA-276, there was disagreement over some 
of the figures within the model reflecting accurate annual 
costs.  Specifically, attempting to divide the annual 
operating cost down to a specific critical component is 
difficult since so many variables contribute to overall 
support cost.  Nonetheless, program team members generally 
agreed that the thesis model was taking into account 
reasonable assumptions and that the output, while not a 
perfect reflection of historical O&S cost figures, would be 
adequate for comparison purposes. 
The critical component analysis presented in scenario 
1 allows the reader to see the relationship between the 
inputs to the spreadsheet model and the outputs in the 
spares levels and LCC.  While it was not surprising to 
discover that the LCC for the current spares levels are 
high, this will be discussed with the Program office and 
examined more thoroughly upon completion of this thesis.  
2. Scenario 2, Decreased Estimates of Reliability, 
Peacetime Operational Scenario 
• Combined 4-Component LCC: $315,206,269 
• Change From Scenario 1: $28,442,740 
As we have discussed previously in this thesis, 
tendencies to overestimate reliability figures can lead to 
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significantly higher LCC.  Again, this points to the fact 
that accurate reliability estimates are important, but 
actual reliability is the most important. 
Scenario 2 made for an interesting contrast with 
scenario 1 as the decreased reliability estimate that we 
input into the model yielded a cost penalty of over $28 
Million dollars, a 10% increase.  At the current cost per 
aircraft, this would allow the program to buy two more 
aircraft, significant quantities of ordnance, or mission 
equipment to expand the capabilities of the aircraft.    
When asked how they would avoid this potential 
decrease in reliability, the members of the H-1 Upgrade 
program stated that they are using methods common within 
the Naval Aviation acquisition system to constantly improve 
reliability.  Some of these methods take into consideration 
the inherent increase in reliability through testing based 
on reliability growth. This is achieved with engineering, 
research, development, Test-Analyze-and-Fix (TAAF), and/or 
Test-Analyze-and-Redesign (TAAR) procedures until the 
product passes its acceptance tests and/or is delivered to 
the end user. 
We were clearly advised by the program office that the 
estimations of reliability were just that, only 
estimations.  Hopefully, demonstrating to the program Team 
members the sensitivity of protection levels and O&S costs 
to the failure rate estimations will emphasize the fact 




3. Scenario 3, Increased Spares Protection Levels, 
Initial Estimates of Reliability, Peacetime 
Operational Tempo Scenario 
• Combined 4-Component LCC: $320,344,807 
• Change From Scenario 1: $33,581,278 
The changes caused by the increased protection level 
were not reflected on the analysis worksheet, but were 
instead evident on the acquisition profile worksheets for 
each component.  Seeking to provide this additional 
protection against stockout, the program office would have 
to buy significantly more spares over the lifetime of the 
program.  This is what caused an increase of over $33 
million compared to the lower protection level. 
Requiring and applying a higher protection is the 
equivalent of buying a premium insurance policy with a low 
deductible.  The risk of stockout is not borne by the 
operator, but by the program.  There is always a 
possibility that a stockout could still occur, but the 
probability is significantly lowered with the higher 
protection level.   
When initial estimates of reliability are uncertain, a 
program should consider increasing the protection levels 
until actual reliability figures emerge.  Adjustments can 
then be made as necessary, all the while keeping the 
aircraft flying.  However, the increased costs of higher 
protection levels, as displayed in Scenario 3, show the 
trade-off decisions that are required by the Program 
Manager when operating with limited resources.  Sometimes, 
risks must be taken.   
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4. Scenario 4a, Current Estimates of Reliability, 
Contingency Operational Tempo 
• Combined 4-Component LCC: $328,134,787 
• Change From Scenario 1: $41,371,258 
The purpose of Scenario 4a was to give the reader a 
feel for how sustained contingency flight operation, or 
higher than expected overall flight hours, could affect the 
spares levels and LCC of an aviation program.   
Based on the unchanged failure rate and increased 
flight hours, the spares levels and LCC changed 
significantly from scenario 1.  Through a 35% increase in 
flight hours, the overall LCC with respect to these 4 
components increased by over $41 Million, or nearly 13%.  
If this carries through to other aspects of the program, 
huge increase in overall LCC could be incurred by a small 
increase in average operating hours.  Therefore, planning 
for all aspects of support for a given platform are highly 
dependant on expected usage rates.       
One thing that is not taken into account in this 
model, however, is the slow reaction time of the industrial 
base to the initial surge in flight hours and increased 
demand for spares.  It is precisely at this moment when the 
pressure is really on the O-Level maintainers to keep the 
aircraft operating.  Frequently, this may have to be 
accomplished through cannibalization, although this comes 
at the cost of wasted maintenance time (removing RFI 
components from other aircraft to replace Non-RFI 
components already removed, and then installing both the 
cannibalized component and the replacement RFI component 
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when it is finally received) and subsequent lower morale 
among the maintenance Marines. 
5. Scenario 4b, Reduced Estimates of Reliability, 
Contingency Operational Tempo 
• Combined 4-Component LCC: $366,920,342 
• Change From Scenario 1: $80,156,813 
The purpose of Scenario 4b was to give the reader a 
feel for how higher than expected overall flight hours, 
coupled with lower than expected reliability could severely 
affect the spares levels and LCC of an aviation program. 
This is a worst-case scenario for any program.  The 
combined blows of higher than expected usage as described 
in scenario 4a above in conjunction with lower than 
expected reliability as described in Scenario 2.  With the 
20% decrease in reliability and the 35% increase in usage, 
the program was suddenly faced with a 28% increase in LCC 
for the four components described. 
This scenario was the most meaningful to the author 
due to the realization that any program that begins 
estimating LCC with overly optimistic estimations of 
reliability and usage could end up costing the taxpayer 
significantly more than anyone expected and jeopardize the 
very existence of their program.       
E. RECAPITALIZATION 
The findings presented here are based on a system life 
of 20 years from IOC.  From past experience in the Marine 
Corps and other services, some airframes (such as the B-52 
and the CH-46) continue operating well past this service  
  76
period.  To take this possibility into account would 
require reworking the spreadsheet model to allow for longer 
life span and related LCC.     
During the life cycle of any system, there comes a 
time when the decision has to be made to either phase-out 
or revitalize the system through a Service Life Extension 
Program (SLEP) or Mid-Life Upgrade (MLU).  This is a 
difficult decision, especially during times of great fiscal 
austerity. 
The basis for the H-1 Upgrade program described in 
this thesis was born of a MLU for the UH-1N.  The Huey has 
lost a significant portion of its combat load, performance, 
and mission radius over the course of three decades due to 
added mission equipment and degraded engine performance.  
It was decided in the early 1990s that both aircraft could 
benefit from upgrading both platforms to recapture the 
commonality they once had. 
The Marine Corps Aviation Master Plan has The H-1 
program being replaced by the “Joint Replacement Aircraft” 
(although no one know what that will look like) starting in 
the year 2020.  Given the uncertainty of this time estimate 
and historical trends to “do more with less for longer,” 
the potential for recapitalization of the new AH-1Z and UH-
1Y is high. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
As has been discussed in this chapter, we utilized the 
information presented in Chapters II and III to allow the 
author to draw conclusions based on an analysis of the 
information gathered.  Inputs into the spreadsheet were 
described for the four scenarios and the results of those 
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inputs noted.  Through these results and their analysis, 
the author will attempt to draw conclusions for 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
In this chapter, we will discuss the analyses, 
conclusions, and recommendations presented by the research 
conducted for this thesis. 
B. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
While there are many areas that have been covered in 
the course of this thesis, there are also many areas that 
need to be investigated in more detail.  By examining the 
list of research questions stated at the beginning of this 
thesis, we can begin to see where light has dawned and 
where gray areas still exist.   
1. Primary Research Question 
• How are reliability estimations and planned spares 
levels related to Life Cycle Costs in a MDAP? 
Analysis:  There is a direct connection between 
reliability estimates, spares levels, and LCC as 
established by the scenarios run in this thesis.  The 
surprising aspect was the degree of interdependence that 
each of these factors has.  During scenario 2 when we 
decreased the reliability of the components analyzed, we 
found a significant increase in LCC. 
With a 20% decrease in the overall reliability of 
these 4 components, we saw a 10% increase in their overall 
LCC.  This translates into huge penalties for a program 
with a current TOC of over $14 Billion and with hundreds of 
parts requiring spares.  As can be deduced from the cursory 
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findings in this thesis, reduced reliability equals 
increased cost in both material and labor.     
Therefore, increased reliability is to the benefit of 
everyone who develops systems for Naval Aviation, 
especially the operators and maintainers of these systems 
once they are fielded. 
Conclusion:  There is a direct relationship between 
poor reliability estimations, inadequate spares levels, and 
higher than expected LCC.   
Recommendation:  Additional emphasis needs to be 
placed on reliability throughout the acquisition 
establishment.  Initiatives such as Performance Based 
Logistics and advanced reliability modeling methods need 
the backing of senior leadership armed with an 
understanding that reliability isn’t everything, it’s the 
only thing.     
2.  Secondary Research Questions 
• What methods are being used by the H-1 Upgrade 
program to improve overall reliability and 
availability? 
Analysis:  When the author approached the H-1 Upgrade 
Program PM with this question, the following response was 
given: 
As with all areas in the development of a weapon 
system, the PM assigns responsibility for 
specific areas to his agents.  He has funded and 
tasked a team to be solely responsible for 
reviewing, monitoring, documenting and 
recommending changes for all reliability issues.  
All issues are documented and resolutions are 
identified.  Unfortunately reliability is 
competing with many other requirements for 
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limited budget and schedule resources and when 
issues are identified there is not always funding 
or schedule available for the correction of 
deficiencies at the time that the issues are 
identified.  Corrections to deficiencies are 
documented and then the responsible IPT  
[Integrated Product Team] will do the analyses 
required to determine the most cost efficient and 
appropriate time for incorporation of the 
changes.  Unfortunately some of the reliability 
recommendations may never make the incorporation 
list as the Business Case Analyses may not show 
the return on investment required to fund the 
modification.   
The H-1 Upgrade program is using methods common to 
Naval Aviation acquisition to improve reliability and 
availability.  Some of these methods take into 
consideration the inherent increase in reliability through 
testing based on reliability growth.  This is achieved with 
engineering, research, development, Test-Analyze-and-Fix 
(TAAF), and/or Test-Analyze-and-Redesign (TAAR) procedures 
until the product passes its acceptance tests and/or is 
delivered to the end user.  Reliability growth is related 
to factors such as reliability requirements, initial 
reliability level, reliability funding and management, 
corrective actions, and competitive factors. 
The goals set forth by the H-1 Upgrade Program for 
individual spares are based on the critical nature of each 
of those components.  Currently, the program is using 
simulation within the ARROWs model to plan protection 
levels of at least 80% for components considered critical 
for meeting their reliability requirements.  This is very 
important as it recognizes the relationship between these 
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critical components and the role they play in maintaining 
and possibly increasing Ao for the systems. 
Conclusion:  Even though an apparent emphasis is being 
placed in reliability, an effective program to reward the 
achievement of higher reliability is not in place. 
Recommendation:  While the Program Manager uses 
metrics for cost, schedule, and performance to meter out 
rewards or reprimands to the contractor during the 
development of the product, a long-term reward system 
should be put into place to share some of the profits from 
higher than expected reliability.  PBL is the first step in 
this direction, but a direct monetary incentive would hit 
the contractor in their bottom line and make all of 
industry takes notice.         
• How is reliability measured in general and by the H-
1 Upgrade Program specifically? 
Analysis:  As was discussed in Chapter II of this 
thesis, the mathematical computation of reliability is 
based on the MTBF of the systems being measured.  
The H-1 Upgrade Program Team is using similar 
measurements for reliability and availability.  
Unfortunately, since the system is still undergoing 
developmental and operational testing, there is no current 
data for the overall system or certain critical components 
in an actual operational environment.  In other words, they 
are still using predicted reliability to make their 
assessments of availability for the system users.  The 
program office is also using historical data from similar 
systems to give additional credibility to their 
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estimations.  This is important since this provides the 
greatest insight into potential pitfalls of underestimating 
reliability for critical component later on. 
Conclusion:  Predictions of reliability are a 
necessary evil that every new MDAP must contend with when 
bringing a new system to the field.  Even a Commercial Off 
The Shelf (COTS) item will need to have its reliability 
predicted for the harsh environment that the military would 
use it in compared with that of a commercial consumer.      
• What information about reliability and availability 
will be of greatest use to the PM to help make more 
informed decisions about O&S cost allocations? 
Analysis:  When the author approached the H-1 Upgrade 
Program PM with this question, the following response was 
given: 
All of the reliability and availability data 
being delivered to the government through the 
supportability analysis process is important to 
the PM for making decisions concerning 
supportability.  But none is more important than 
the other.  All data is considered.  The 
availability and reliability data is initially 
delivered to the government from the contractor 
through the Supportability Analyses process.  The 
initial numbers are engineering predictions and 
some of the initial logistics support planning is 
done using these predictions.  But, as the 
systems mature and as actual data is collected 
then the maintenance planning and logistics 
support planning is updated to reflect actual 
availability numbers.  So for the PM, through his 
agents [logistics support personnel], all of the 
data delivered through the Supportability 
Analysis (SA) is very important in the decision 
making process for the Program, but none carries 
more weight than another.  The types of data used 
are mean times between failures, mean times to 
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repair, Ao, material replacement rates, and 
reliability centered maintenance data.  Each data 
type is used in a different way, e.g., mean times 
for repair and failure data determine the sparing 
levels for spare parts, reliability centered 
maintenance data will help determine the IMC 
(Intermediate Maintenance Concept) and SDLM 
(Scheduled Depot Level Maintenance) requirements, 
etc. 
This was followed with a question about Performance 
Based Logistics (PBL), which is starting to make Naval 
Aviation acquisition place greater emphasis on reliability: 
      The H-1 Program is in the initial stages of 
determining its PBL concept and an emphasis will 
be placed on reliability and availability, but 
LCC will still be a factor in the development of 
the PBL strategy.  The PBL Warfighter Agreement 
for the H-1 program has not yet been defined and 
that is the document that will spell out the 
specifics for the reliability, availability and 
LCC requirements.     
Conclusion:  Methods are being explored by the PM to 
emphasize higher reliability.  This is an encouraging 
development for all members of the H-1 Upgrade Program and 
the eventual users of the system.  Any method to place 
greater emphasis on reliability will benefit all concerned 
parties and should be investigated.  Unfortunately, it is 
also clear that reliability cannot be the sole focus of the 
busy PM.   
Recommendation:  The program office needs to continue 
pursuing PBL and other methods to place emphasis on higher 
reliability.  Additionally, greater emphasis needs to be 
placed on obtaining more accurate reliability predictions.    
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• What is the impact on LCC and spares levels if the 
flight hours are more than planned? 
Analysis:  The purpose of Scenario 4a was to give the 
reader a feel for how sustained contingency flight 
operation, or higher than expected overall flight hours, 
could affect the spares levels and LCC of an aviation 
program.  Based on the unchanged failure rate and increased 
flight hours, the spares levels and LCC changed 
significantly from Scenario 1.  Through a 35% increase in 
flight hours, the overall LCC with respect to these 4 
components increased by over $41 million, or nearly 13%.  
If this carries through to other aspects of the program, 
huge increase in overall LCC could be incurred by a small 
increase in average operating hours.  Therefore, planning 
for all aspects of support for a given platform are highly 
dependant on expected usage rates.       
Conclusion:  Unfortunately, purchasing of spares is 
not as flexible for the program office as increasing flight 
hours is for the operational units.  Therefore, in the 
interest of buffering the impact of flight hour surges due 
to potential hostilities, all Naval Aviation programs are 
required to purchase more spares for contingencies than 
they would need for sustained peacetime operations.  These 
spares are kept in “Contingency Spares Pack-ups” (CSPs) 
that take up the slack in the normal spares pipeline to 
allow the program office time to order and ship more spares 
when demand spikes.  These CSP spares are regularly rotated 
out of and back into the normal spares system during 
peacetime to maintain their “freshness.” 
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The short-term results of increased flight hours due 
to surge operations is a higher price for the spares that 
are ordered to replace those that are being taken out of 
the Cusps.  Contractors need to accommodate the greater 
demand by possibly opening additional assembly lines, 
hiring new employees, or requiring their current employees 
to work extra hours.  These costs are passed along to the 
program office (and the Fleet) through the increased price 
for the required spares. 
Recommendation:  During times of higher than “average” 
usage rates, such as the current Global War on Terrorism, 
each program office should reassess its spares levels just 
as it should regularly do when better reliability estimates 
are available.  While no one can predict how long this 
higher optempo will last, these are the times when it is 
imperative that the warfighters have all the spares they 
need to achieve mission accomplishment.  
• After system fielding, how are spares levels 
adjusted as estimations of reliability are replaced 
by actual reliability figures of merit? 
Analysis:  In an excerpt from the first PM quote 
above: 
Corrections to deficiencies are documented and 
then the responsible IPT will do the analyses 
required to determine the most cost efficient and 
appropriate time for incorporation of the 
changes.  Unfortunately some of the reliability 
recommendations may never make the incorporation 
list as the Business Case Analyses may not show 
the return on investment required to fund the 
modification.   
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As reports from the system maintainers at the O-Level 
and I-Level begin to report on the actual MTBF and 
reliability of components, monthly feedback through the 
Reliability and Maintainability Office at NAVAIR highlights 
these figures of merit (FOM) to the program office.  If the 
FOM are within a certain tolerance of the predicted 
reliability of the component, then nothing is done until 
the FOM are subsequently reviewed. 
If a critical component is below the tolerance set by 
the Deputy Program Manager for Logistics (DPML) at the 
program, a review of the reasons for the discrepancy is 
initiated.  This process could take several months as 
interviews are conducted, statistics are reviewed, and 
maintenance practices scrutinized.  In the meantime, parts 
shortages may mount as the supply system expends any 
remaining spares that may be available.  Cannibalization of 
good parts from other aircraft increases as the needs of 
the user to meet operational requirements is hampered by 
the lack of spares.  Also, the call for an increase in 
spares is not instantaneous and requires significant lead 
time by the suppliers to manufacture the additional 
requirements. 
Unfortunately, a cautious attitude at the program 
office concerning dedicating additional funds to shoring up 
this shortfall may only compound the situation. 
The demonstration of reduced reliability in Scenario 3 
does not take into account the “worst case scenario” that 
has been demonstrated within other acquisition programs in 
Naval Aviation, such as the F/A-18 TEF actuator cited in 
Ref 4.  Should the H-1 Upgrade Program experience one of 
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these extremely poor performing critical components, all 
aspects of the program support structure may be affected. 
Conclusion:  Adjustment of spares level requirements 
is a complicated task that may not receive the proper 
emphasis on a busy program, even when significant cost 
benefits can be realized. 
Recommendation:  An independent reliability monitoring 
structure within the acquisition community should be 
established that has the sole purpose of matching actual 
reliability information with programmatic parts sparing.  
Eventually, recommendations from this entity could be 
evaluated by the program office to determine whether 
adjustment of spares levels are warranted.     
C. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
As has been stated previously in this thesis, there 
are many interesting areas that have been touched on only 
lightly, but that would benefit all acquisition programs 
with additional research. 
Additional study of initial investment versus LCC 
would highlight to members of the acquisition community 
that, even though it is politically unpopular to put 
greater emphasis on reliability research funding during 
EMD, this could save the entire DoD and Federal Government 
huge amounts of money as O&S cost savings are realized. 
Another difficult truth for all acquisition 
professionals to bear is that full disclosure of LCC early 
in a programs development can lead to critical review and 
possibly elimination of the program.  Therefore, as was 
touched on briefly in this thesis, initial reliability  
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estimations may be overly optimistic in accordance with the 
overall savings they create in the estimated LCC of the 
program. 
Lastly, new initiatives designed to provide greater 
transparency to Total Ownership Cost (TOC) and highlight 
key investments such as Performance Based Logistics (PBL) 
and Navy Visibility and Management of Operating and Support 
Cost (VAMOSC) Personnel Universe are vital for everyone 
from the PM to the Secretary of Defense to clearly see 
where the best investment of DoD dollars can be found.  PBL 
is taking hold within the NAVAIR acquisition community and 
will play a major role in the future as programs vie for 
tight resources. 
PBL is attempting to make use of Ao as a KPP for 
programs within DoD.  The results of the initial efforts at 
this should be provided further study and greater 
visibility for the acquisition community to understand the 
benefits of emphasizing reliability at a programs outset.          
D. SUMMARY 
A variety of conclusions have been reached as a result 
of this research.  Some conclusions may have an impact on 
the H-1 Upgrade Program specifically and some on the DoD 
acquisition community in general.  
The desire to push a program through to LRIP with 
minimal initial investment has placed greater emphasis on 
lowering investment during the EMD phase, to the detriment 
that the greater investment would have on keeping down 
costs during the O&S phase.  In other words, a program can 
look more attractive now by spending less up front and 
hoping that reliability growth curves will be met or 
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exceeded in production.  This problem has been identified 
in other publications, but may still be haunting the 
acquisition field within Naval Aviation. 
The H-1 Upgrade Program may be falling into the above-
mentioned trap.  It is faced with the dilemma of needing to 
look “lean and mean” when pushing forward to Milestone C, 
but may be putting off cost until the time comes to pay the 
O&S bills.  Without proper emphasis on high reliability for 
critical components (and the overall system) in the 
beginning, the amazing helicopters that the program office 
is developing may be inoperable when they are needed most 
due to overestimations of reliability and a subsequent lack 
of spare parts. 
As a whole, if Naval Aviation continues to 
overestimate reliability and underestimate LCC during the 
initial phases of an acquisition cycle, all programs may 
suffer from a lack of trust with the American public and 
the DoD Acquisition establishment.  Also, one of the hidden 
costs of poor reliability estimates is the deteriorating 
morale of the maintainers who must work longer hours than 
necessary to accomplish redundant work when having to 
cannibalize parts due to shortages.  It is on the backs of 
these Marines that our Nation maintains its edge and its 
ability to carry the torch of Freedom around the world. 
Within the scope of this thesis, we have discussed the 
impact of inaccurate reliability estimates and unforeseen 
flight hour increases on the LCC of the components we chose 
to analyze.  Through analysis of the interaction of these 
factors we have come to the conclusion that reliability 
should be the main emphasis of this (and any other) 
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program.  There can be severe repercussions to 
misunderstanding the importance of reliability in the life 
cycle of any program. 
Right now, within the DoD and Naval Aviation 
acquisition, steps are being taken (such as PBL) to ensure 
the proper emphasis is being placed on reliability within 
our programs.  This emphasis is crucial, not only to the 
warfighters who need their equipment to operate properly 
when it is needed, but to every taxpayer in the nation who 
want more accountability and typically wants the DoD to do 
more with less.  By understanding that increased 
reliability is a sound investment in a program’s future and 
the DoD’s future, our leadership will insist from now on 
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APPENDIX 
1. SPREADSHEET MODEL 
a. Scenario 1 (baseline) 
 The following cells are a screen capture of the 
worksheets using the inputs from scenario 1 in Chapter IV. 
 
 
Aircraft Per Squadron 27
Monthly Flight Hours 22
Reliability, Spares, and Protection Level Analysis 
 
 








Per I-level Repair TAT Failures/ Sqn Failures/ Sqn
Critical Component For Analysis MFHBF MTBF (days) λ (Days) During the TAT Per Year
T700 Engine 100 136.36 0.00733 5 0.99 72.27
Combining Gear Box 2500 3409.09 0.00029 45 0.36 2.89
Main Transmission 5000 6818.18 0.00015 60 0.24 1.45
Main Rotor Blades 550 750.00 0.00133 30 1.08 13.14


































Avg Annual Maint Avg Total Annual Initial Spare Purchase Total Component
Unit Acq Cost Cost/ Failure Maint Cost Cost per Sqn 20 Yr LCC
695,000$         85,000$              6,142,950$          2,085,000$               187,930,428$         
476,000$         50,000$              144,540$             476,000$                 22,704,857$           
38,086,790$           
38,041,454$           
930,000$         200,000$             289,080$             930,000$                 
233,000$         15,000$              197,100$             699,000$                 
Total 286,763,529$         
Table 7.   Analysis Worksheet Input/Output 
 
Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7 combined are the “Analysis” worksheet 
combining all the user inputs and the calculations from the 
individual component worksheets described in scenario 1 and 
shows the total LCC for scenario 1. 
Tables 8, 9, and 10 are screen captures of the “Acquisition 
Profile” worksheet (in this case the engine, but nearly 
identical to the other components except for individual 
costs) used to calculate the LCC of the individual 
components using scenario 1 inputs. 
 
Current H-1 Program Acquisition Profile/ Engines
Fiscal Year 2004 2005 2006 2007
UH-1Y Produced 2 0 3 6
AH-1Z Produced 3 0 2 4
Total AC Produced/ Year 5 0 5
Total AC Inventory 8 5 10
Total FY I-Level Spares Purchase 2 2 2 5



























Years of Operation 1 2 3 4
Initial Spares Purchase 1,390,000$         1,390,000$         1,390,000$         3,475,000$         
Annual Maintenance Cost 6,142,950$         6,142,950$         6,142,950$         6,142,950$         
Total (FY2004) 7,532,950$         7,532,950$         7,532,950$         9,617,950$         
Inflation (Then Year) 7,834,268$         8,147,639$         8,473,544$         11,251,641$       
PV (FY2004) 7,308,086$         7,089,934$         6,878,294$         8,519,944$         
NPV 187,930,428$     
Inflation Rate 4.00%
Discount Rate 3.20%
Table 9.   Acquisition Profile Worksheet 
Input/Output 
As can be seen in these tables, the fiscal years from 2008 
to 2023 are not shown in these tables but are present in 
the model.  Likewise, the years of operation from year 5 to 
year 20 are also not shown.  
 
 
2024 2025 2026 2027 Totals
0 0 0 0 102
0 0 0 0 183
0 0 0 0 285
285 285 285 285 285
2 2 2 2 165
159 161 163 165 165
21 22 23 24
1,390,000$         1,390,000$         1,390,000$         1,390,000$         
6,142,950$         6,142,950$         6,142,950$         6,142,950$         
7,532,950$         7,532,950$         7,532,950$         7,532,950$         
17,165,846$       17,852,480$       18,566,579$       19,309,242$       














Table 10.   Acquisition Profile Worksheet 
Input/Output 
 
Both of these worksheets are used for all the different 
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